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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Felicity Kathleen Haynes appeals from the district court's intermediate 
appellate decision affirming her conviction for misdemeanor driving under the 
influence of alcohol (DUI). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on February 23, 2013, Idaho State Police 
Trooper Tom Keys pulled Haynes over for, among other things, failing to properly 
signal a lane change and failing to maintain her lane of travel. (R., p.9; 7/18/13 
Tr., p.20, L.10 - p.24, L.3, p.35, L.8 - p.19.) Haynes smelled like alcohol, her 
"eyes were reddened and her speech was slurred," and she failed field sobriety 
testing. (R., p.9.) Trooper Keys arrested Haynes for DUI and placed her in the 
backseat of his patrol vehicle. (R., p.9; Defendant's Exhibit 8.) After playing an 
audio recording of the Idaho administrative license suspension (ALS) advisories, 
the trooper asked Haynes if she would consent to a breath alcohol test. (R., p.9; 
Defendant's Exhibit 8.) Haynes consented and, after the mandatory 15-minute 
waiting period, gave two breath samples using a hand-held Lifeloc breath testing 
device. (R., p.9; Defendant's Exhibit 8.) The results of the test showed Haynes 
had a breath alcohol content (SAC) of .161/.158. (R., pp.9, 11; Defendant's 
Exhibit 8.) 
The state charged Haynes with a first offense DUI. (R., p.7.) Haynes filed 
a motion in !imine to exclude her breath test results, contending the failure of the 
Idaho State Police (ISP) to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the Idaho 
1 
Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA) in adopting Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and other methods for breath testing "makes all such testing 
too unreliable for use at a criminal trial under I. C. § 18-8004." (R., pp.23-33, 124-
34; see also R., pp.34-123, 135-236, 254-60, 265-69 (supplemental materials 
filed in support of motion in limine).) She also filed a motion to suppress the 
breath test results, contending they were the fruit of an unlawful traffic stop and, 
alternatively, that the reading of the ALS advisories rendered her consent to the 
breath test invalid. (R., pp.237-38, 240-50.) Finally, she filed a motion for the 
appointment of an ex parte judge to conduct an ex parte hearing on a request for 
public funds to assist in the preparation of her defense. (R., pp.261-64.) After a 
hearing, the district court denied all of Haynes' motions. (R., pp.271-78, 281-82; 
see generally 7/18/13 Tr.) 
Haynes entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right on appeal to 
challenge: (1) the denial of her pretrial motions, and (2) a June 4, 2013 order that 
granted the state's motion for a continuance of the originally scheduled hearing 
on her motion in limine and motion to suppress. (R., pp.283-84; see also 6/4/13 
Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.8, L.13.) The magistrate accepted Haynes' plea and entered 
an order withholding judgment. (R., pp.285-86.) Haynes timely appealed to the 
district court (R., pp.287-90), which affirmed (R., pp.377-78). Haynes again 
timely appeals. (R., pp.379-83.) 
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ISSUES 
Haynes states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether the state's failure to secure the presence of a 
necessary witness is good cause to continue a hearing that 
can determine the outcome of the matter. 
II. Whether the Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth Amendments and Idaho 
Judicial Cannon 3 require that a defendant applying for 
funds to assist in her defense be provided an ex parte 
hearing before an ex parte judge and what burden, if any, 
the defendant must beet prior to being granted such hearing. 
Ill. Whether the Idaho State Police have properly promulgated 
rules for the administration of breath testing. 
IV. Whether the Idaho State Police have promulgated rules that 
ensure accuracy as required by I.C. § 18-8002A and I.C. § 
18-8004(4). 
V. Whether State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d 219 (Idaho Ct.App.2013), 
is manifestly wrong and should be overruled. 
VI. Whether the Administrative License Suspension advisory 
coerces and invalidates the defendant's consent to providing 
a breath sample under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Haynes failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate did not abuse its discretion by granting the state's motion for a 
continuance of the hearing on Haynes' motion to suppress? 
2. Has Haynes failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate did not violate Haynes' constitutional rights by denying Haynes' 
motion to present her request for funds to an ex parte judge in an ex parte 
proceeding? 
3. Has Haynes failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts in denying Haynes' motion to 
exclude the breath test results? 
3 
4. Has Haynes failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts in denying Haynes' motion to 
suppress the breath test results based on Haynes' assertion that the mere 
reading of the ALS advisories rendered her consent to the breath test invalid? 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
I. 
Haynes Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The 
Magistrate Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Granting The State's Motion For A 
Continuance Of The Hearing On Haynes' Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
The hearing on Haynes' motion to suppress and motion in limine was 
originally scheduled for June 3, 2013. (R., p.239.) The prosecutor moved for a 
continuance on the day of the hearing, in part because Trooper Keys had a 
childcare issue that prevented him from being present to testify as to the 
suppression issues. (6/4/13 Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.3, L.18.) Haynes had no objection 
to the state's request for a continuance as it related to one of the suppression 
issues on which Haynes' attorney had only very recently filed a brief and to which 
the prosecutor had not had an opportunity to respond. (6/4/13 Tr., p.4, L.20 -
p.5, L.8.) She objected to continuing the hearing as to the suppression issues to 
which Trooper Key's testimony was relevant, however, asserting that a 
continuance would "impune [sic] the neutrality of the Court" and that "the State 
has [not] provided any lawful reason for their witness not being here." (6/4/13 
Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.5, L.16.) The magistrate granted the state's request and 
continued the hearing as to both motions, finding the unavailability of Trooper 
Keys constituted good cause for continuing the hearing on Haynes' suppression 
motion. (6/4/13 Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.8, L.13.) The district court subsequently 
affirmed the magistrate's ruling. (R., p.377; 2/21 /14 Tr., p.11, L.12 - p.12, L.11.) 
Haynes challenges the lower courts' rulings, arguing the magistrate "erred 
when it found good cause to continue the defendant's motion to suppress 
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because it failed to apply the proper balancing test and incorrectly determined 
that the witness was unavailable," and "[t]he District Court erred in affirming the 
ruling based on the Magistrate's reputation for fairness." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
Haynes' arguments fail. 1 A review of the record and of the applicable law 
supports the district court's holding that the magistrate did not abuse its 
discretion by granting the state's motion to continue the suppression hearing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kt 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kt (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
1 Because the magistrate did hold a hearing on the motion to suppress, there is 
no remedy for any alleged error in the timing of the hearing. Because no viable 
remedy for the alleged error exists, the claim is actually moot. State v. Barclay, 
149 Idaho 6, 8,232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010). 
6 
"[T]he granting of a motion for continuance is vested in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and the action of that court will not be disturbed 
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Richardson, 95 
Idaho 446, 448, 511 P.2d 263, 265 (1973) (citations omitted); accord State v. 
Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736, 240 P.3d 575, 582 (201 0); State v. Miller, 133 
Idaho 454, 457, 988 P.2d 680, 683 (1999); Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, _, 
320 P.3d 1284, 1290 (Ct. App. 2014). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded The Magistrate Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion In Granting The State's Motion To Continue The Suppression 
Hearing 
The decision to grant or deny a request for a continuance lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. In exercising its discretion in a criminal case, 
the trial court must weigh the competing interests of the state and the defendant. 
Miller, 133 Idaho at 458, 988 P.2d at 684 (citing State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 
703, 707, 864 P.2d 149, 153 (1993)). Among the interests to be considered 
when the state is the moving party are the reason(s) for the proposed delay, any 
potential prejudice to the defendant, and what effect, if any, a continuance would 
have on the defendant's speedy trial rights. kl Where the record demonstrates 
the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and arrived at its decision by an exercise of reason, a 
trial court's decision to grant a continuance will not be deemed an abuse of 
discretion. kl 
Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case 
supports the district court's determination that the magistrate did not abuse its 
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discretion in granting the state's motion to continue the suppression hearing. 
The state requested the continuance because its witness, Trooper Keys, had a 
childcare issue that prevented him from attending the June 4, 2013 hearing. 
(6/4/13 Tr., p.2, Ls.8-10.) Although Haynes' attorney speculated - without any 
apparent good faith basis for doing so - that the officer was merely "playing 
hooky" (6/4/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.16-19), the magistrate accepted the prosecutor's 
representation "that Trooper Keys had some emergency come up where he just 
honestly couldn't make it" and, so, was unavailable as a witness at the June 4, 
2013 hearing (6/4/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-18). The court considered Haynes' interest in 
having her motions timely decided (see 6/4/13 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.8) and 
weighed that interest against the interests of both parties in having the many 
legal issues raised by Haynes' motions decided on their merits ( see 6/4/13 Tr., 
p.6, L.9 - p.8, L.11 ). Specifically with respect to Haynes' suppression motion the 
court reasoned: 
On the motion to suppress the evidence seized following the 
vehicle stop, [the state's] witness is unavailable, and I'm gonna 
accept that Trooper Keys had some emergency come up where he 
just honestly couldn't make it here. Whether it's babysitting or 
hooky or whatever, I'm gonna give him the benefit of the doubt 
based on [the prosecutor's] inquiry that he just isn't available as a 
witness today. And so I think that's good cause for continuing that 
particular motion, uh, to give both sides a chance to have their 
actual witnesses here in that case because I mean that -
sometimes that decides the case. If in fact there was an unlawful 
stop of the vehicle, then virtually everything that follows after that 
uh, may not be used as evidence and that can be dispositive 
sometimes. Again, I don't know the underlying facts and 
circumstances, but if your lawyer thinks there's a good faith basis 
for bringing that and he thinks he's entitled to be heard, the only 
way we're gonna be able to hear that is if I continue the case. 
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(6/4/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.4.) Having considered the unavailability of the 
state's witness and the interests of fairness to both parties, the court ultimately 
concluded that "denying the continuance would [not] make sense" and, 
therefore, exercised its discretion to continue the hearing on all of Haynes' 
pretrial motions. The court's exercise of discretion is supported not only by the 
considerations it specifically cited, but also by the record that demonstrates 
Haynes suffered no prejudice as a result of the court's decision to continue the 
hearing on her suppression motion. 
When the state moved to continue the hearing on Haynes' motion to 
suppress, Haynes had already waived her speedy trial rights. (R., p.239.) 
Continuing the suppression hearing due to the unavailability of the state's 
witness thus in no way jeopardized Haynes' right to a speedy trial. Nor did 
continuing the hearing actually delay the resolution of Haynes' case beyond the 
time it would have been delayed to hear other motions pending in the case. 
Haynes' attorney acknowledged at the June 4, 2013 hearing that the state had 
not had adequate time to respond to one of the suppression issues that he had 
only recently briefed, and he specifically indicated he did not "have any real 
objection" to the state's request for a continuance as it related to that issue. 
(6/14/13 Tr., p.4, L.20 - p.5, L.8.) Having effectively stipulated to a continuance 
of the hearing for the purpose of arguing one of the issues raised by her 
suppression motion, Haynes suffered no additional delay or inconvenience by 
having the hearing relating to the suppression issue upon which Trooper Keys' 
testimony was relevant continued, as well - especially since the record shows 
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the two suppression issues (as well as the issues raised by Haynes in her motion 
in fimine) were ultimately heard and resolved at the same hearing. (R., pp.271-
78, 281-82; 7/18/13 Tr., generally.) 
The magistrate weighed the appropriate considerations and exercised 
reason in deciding to grant the state's motion for a continuance. Because it did 
so, and because the record shows Haynes was not prejudiced by having all of 
the issues raised in her suppression motion heard and ruled upon at the same 
time, the magistrate properly exercised its discretion in granting the state's 
motion to continue the hearing on Haynes' suppression motion. 
Haynes argues otherwise. Citing I.C.R. 45(b)(2), she contends the 
magistrate did not have discretion to grant the state's motion for a continuance 
except for good cause and upon a showing by the state that its inability to go 
forward with the hearing on the originally scheduled date was the result of 
"excusable neglect." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) Haynes' reliance on Rule 45(b) 
is misplaced. Rule 45 governs the time for the filing and service of documents in 
a criminal case. See !.C.R. 45(a) (rule for "computing the time period prescribed 
or allowed for the filing or service of any document in these [criminal] rules"), (c) 
(setting forth time for serving motions and affidavits), (d) (giving party additional 
time to respond to notice or other paper served by mail). Although Rule 45(b) 
limits the authority of a court to enlarge the time for the doing of "an act, other 
than the filing of a notice of appeal," that is "required or allowed to be done at or 
within a specified time," the "act" referred to is necessarily one of the acts whose 
timing is actually covered by the rule - i.e., the filing or service of documents. 
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Because a hearing on a suppression motion is not the filing or service of the 
motion itself, the hearing is not an "act" for purposes of Ru!e 45(b)(2), and its 
timing is not controlled by that rule.2 Haynes' assertion that the state "should 
have had to show excusable neglect" as required by Rule 45(b )(2) (Appellant's 
brief, p.8) is therefore without merit. The proper standard is discretion, not 
"excusable neglect." See State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 448, 511 P.2d 263, 
265 (1973). 
Haynes next argues that the magistrate abused its discretion by finding 
good cause to continue the suppression hearing based upon its determination 
that Trooper Keys was unavailable as a witness. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9). 
According to Haynes, the inability of Trooper Keys to attend the June 4, 2013 
hearing did not constitute good cause to continue the hearing, as a matter of law, 
because the circumstances of the trooper's absence - a childcare issue - did 
not meet the definition of "unavailability" set forth in I.RE. 804(a). (Appellant's 
brief, p.9.) Haynes' argument is misguided. Rule 804, I.RE., is an evidentiary 
rule that permits a party to introduce the out-of-court statements of a declarant, 
that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay, when the declarant is unavailable 
2 Haynes asserts that, aside from I.C.R 45, "[n]o law in Idaho controls the 
making of pretrial motions in a criminal proceeding." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
This is patently incorrect. Idaho Criminal Rule 12, subsections (b) and (d), 
specifically set forth the time limits in which a motion to suppress must be filed. 
Rule 12(d) also provides that, "[i]n felony cases, such motions must be brought 
on for hearing within fourteen (14) days after filing or forty eight (48) hours before 
trial whichever is earlier." I.C.R 12(d) (emphasis added). The state is unaware 
of any comparable rule in misdemeanor cases. Even assuming the time limits of 
I.C.R. 12(d) applied to Haynes' misdemeanor DUI prosecution, however, the rule 
specifically states that the "court in its discretion may shorten or enlarge the time" 
for hearing the defendant's suppression motion. 
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as a witness at the trial or hearing at which the statements are being offered. In 
this case, the state was not attempting to offer Trooper Keys' out-of-court 
statements into evidence; rather, the state sought a continuance of the hearing 
so that Trooper Keys could testify in person as to the circumstances that led to 
Haynes' arrest for DUI. Because the state was seeking a continuance to present 
live testimony, not attempting to offer any out-of-court statements, the state was 
not required to show, and magistrate was not required to find, that the 
circumstances of Trooper Keys' absence met the unavailability requirements of 
I.RE. 804(a). 
Indeed, with the exception of cases in which the defendant's speedy trial 
rights are affected, the state is unaware of any requirement that the prosecution 
demonstrate its absent witness is "unavailable," as a matter of law, before the 
trial court may grant the state's request for a continuance. To the contrary, Idaho 
precedent makes clear that the determination of whether a witness' absence 
constitutes good cause warranting a continuance of the proceedings rests in the 
trial court's discretion. See Miller, 133 Idaho at 458, 988 P.2d at 684 (upholding 
district court's order granting state's motion for continuance where the "court 
weighed the prejudice to Miller, the inconvenience to Miller and his witnesses 
and to the court against what the district court considered good cause for the 
continuance - the illness of the State's primary witness"). 
Finally, Haynes argues she was prejudiced by the continuance because, 
had the state been forced to proceed at the originally scheduled suppression 
hearing without its key witness, the suppression motion would necessarily have 
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been granted and the case against her ultimately dismissed. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.10-12.) Haynes' attempt to equate the interest of the state in presenting its 
case on the merits with a showing of unfair prejudice - when Haynes was not 
otherwise hampered in the preparation of her defense or deprived of her right to 
a speedy trial - finds no support in the law. 
The magistrate weighed Haynes' interests against the state's need for a 
continuance due to the unavailability of a witness. "The weighing process 
reflects the fact that the [magistrate] perceived the issue as one of discretion and 
the record demonstrates that it acted within the boundaries of that discretion." 
Miller, 133 Idaho at 458, 988 P.2d at 684. Haynes has failed to show that the 
district court erred in affirming the magistrate's order granting the state's motion 
for a continuance. 
11. 
Haynes Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
The Magistrate Did Not Violate Haynes' Constitutional Rights By Denying 
Haynes' Motion To Present Her Request For Funds To An Ex Parle Judge In An 
Ex Parle Proceeding 
A. Introduction 
Haynes moved the magistrate for an order permitting her to file an ex 
parte application for funds to hire an expert to assist in the preparation of her 
defense and appointing an ex parle judge (a.k.a. a "money judge") to hold an ex 
parte hearing on such application. (R., pp.261-264.) Elaborating on the bases 
for the request, Haynes' attorney explained: 
We would be seeking to have a judge come in that could hear an 
ex parte request for funds to assist us in the defense in this case. 
But uh, the only reason we would need that is if we're dealing with 
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the breath test because that's essentially where we would need 
some sort of assistance that mere cross-examination would not be 
able to provide. 
And so that's - so essentially we're asking that ... [the] Court 
... enter an order that uh, another judge come in to hear that. It's 
an ex parte proceeding because we have to give up some of the 
theories of our case and provide both mitigating and uh, 
aggravating factors, and it's just not fair to anyone, and also under 
the law it states that it's to be an ex parte hearing .... 
(7/18/13 Tr., p.13, L.20- p.14, L.10.) 
The magistrate denied the motion after a hearing, finding, inter a!ia, that 
Haynes failed to make a "sufficient showing to require the appointment of 
another judge to simply hear a request for expert assistance," that Haynes would 
not necessarily have to disclose any defense theories in order to make a prima 
facie showing of a need for expert assistance, and that its own neutrality would 
not be impacted "at all" if Haynes presented a "properly supported" request for 
funds directly to the magistrate. (7/18/13 Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.16, L.16.) 
On appeal to the district court, Haynes argued that the denial of her 
motion for ex parte proceedings and the appointment of a money judge violated 
her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. (2/21/14 
Tr., p.12, L.14 - p.20, L.17.) The district court rejected Haynes' argument, 
holding, based in part on State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998), 
that the ex parte procedures advocated for by Haynes are not constitutionally 
required. (2/21/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.4-16.) Applying an abuse of discretion standard, 
the court affirmed the magistrate's order denying Haynes' motion for ex parte 
proceedings on her request for funds. (2/21/14 Tr., p.21, L.10 - p.22, L.24.) 
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Haynes challenges the lower courts' rulings, arguing as she did below that 
the Constitution requires "an automatic ex parle hearing" and the appointment of 
an ex parle judge when an indigent defendant requests public funds for the 
purpose of hiring an expert to assist in the preparation of his or her defense. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-18.) Haynes' argument fails because it is directly 
contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Wood, supra. To the extent 
Haynes argues Wood should be overruled, she has failed to advance any 
persuasive justification for departing from the holding therein that an indigent 
defendant has no constitutional right to present his or her request for expert 
assistance to an ex parle judge in an ex parle proceeding. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
"[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 714 
(2014). 
C. Haynes Had No Constitutional Right To Present Her Request For Publicly 
Funded Expert Assistance To An Ex Parle Judge In An Ex Parle 
Proceeding 
Indigent defendants are entitled as a matter of due process and equal 
protection to the "basic tools of an adequate defense," including the provision of 
expert assistance at public expense when such is necessary for a fair trial. Ake 
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v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 
227 (1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 
53. 65, 90 P.3d 278, 290 (2003); State v. Olin, 130 Idaho 391, 394, 648 P.2d 
203, 206 (1982); State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 361-63, 195 P.3d 716, 720-22 
(Ct. App. 2008). in Idaho, these rights are safeguarded by Idaho Code § 19-
852(a)(2), which states that needy defendants are entitled "to be provided with 
the necessary services and facilities of representation (including investigation 
and other preparation)." See Olin, 103 Idaho at 394, 648 P.2d at 206 ("Included 
within the scope of I.C. § 19-852(a) are the fourteenth amendment requirements 
of due process and equal protection as they apply to indigent defendants."). 
However, nothing in the Constitution or in I.C. § 19-852(a) prescribes any 
particular procedure that must be followed when an indigent defendant seeks 
funds to assist in the preparation of his or her defense. 3 In fact, in State v. 
Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 99-100, 967 P.2d 702, 713-14 (1998), the Idaho Supreme 
3 Effective August 1, 2014, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a new rule of 
criminal procedure, I.C.R. 12.2, that sets forth the procedures to be followed 
when a defendant "seek[s] funds to pay for investigative, expert, or other 
services that he believes to be necessary for his defense." I.C.R. 12.2(a). 
Pursuant to the newly adopted rule, "[t]he motion seeking public funds shall be 
submitted to the court ex parte, except" service on the public defender is 
required when "the motion for additional defense services is filed by private 
counsel for the defendant, and the additional defense services are to be 
provided through funds budgeted to the public defender." I.C.R. 12.2(d), (g). 
The rule also provides that "[t]he court, in its discretion, may request that the 
Administrative District Judge appoint another judge to consider and conduct any 
hearing on the motion and to decide upon the motion." I.C.R. 12.2(e). 
Rule 12.2, I.C.R., is irrelevant to the determination of the issue before this 
Court for two obvious reasons. First, the rule did not exist at the time Haynes 
filed her motion for ex parte proceedings on her application for expert 
assistance. Second, what the new rule prescribes and what the Constitution 
requires are two entirely different questions. 
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Court specifica!!y rejected the argument, nearly identical to that made by Haynes 
in this case, "that an ex parte procedure for obtaining expert assistance is 
constitutionaily required." 
Like Haynes, Wood argued that "he should have been permitted to (apply 
for] and obtain financial and expert assistance without notice to the prosecutor." 
kL at 99, 967 P.2d at 713. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, observing the 
Supreme Court of the United States had specifically left "to the States the 
decision on how to implement" the right to expert assistance. kL at 100, 967 
P.2d at 714 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83). Citing I.C. § 19-852(a)(2), the Wood 
Court noted that "[n]othing in [that statute] guarantees an ex parte application for 
the assistance." Wood, 132 Idaho at 100, 967 P.2d at 714. The Court also held, 
"The fact that the prosecutor knows of the application for such assistance does 
not deny the defendant due process." kL (emphasis added). 
The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to Wood's assertion 
that he had a constitutional right to the appointment of "a so-called 'money judge' 
to rule on the requests for funding the investigation and to pay experts." kL The 
Court reiterated its prior holding that, under I.C. § 19-852(a), the decision 
whether to grant a request for financial assistance is vested in the trial court, who 
must "inquire into the needs of the defendant and the circumstances of the case, 
and then make a determination of whether an adequate defense will be available 
to the defendant without the requested expert or investigative aid." kL (quoting 
Olin, 103 Idaho at 395, 648 P.2d at 207). The Court then concluded, "The 
statute does not provide for the appointment of a 'money judge,' and this Court 
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has stated that the grant or denial of assistance is left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. There is no constitutional infirmity in this process." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Haynes appears to acknowledge the holding of Wood i.e., that there is 
no constitutional right to ex parte proceedings in relation to a request for expert 
assistance - but she argues, illogically, "That is why this Court must find that the 
procedural requirement for an automatic ex parte hearing when the defense is 
requesting funds is required under the Constitution." (Appellant's brief, p.14 
(emphasis added).) To the extent this Court interprets Haynes' argument as a 
request that Wood be overruled, this Court should decline to do so. It is well 
settled that controlling precedent must be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. 
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). Haynes 
has not even acknowledged this bedrock principle of appellate review, much less 
advanced any persuasive justification for departing from the holding of Wood 
that an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to present his or her 
request for expert assistance to an ex parle judge in an ex parte proceeding. 
As support for her claim that an indigent defendant seeking funds is 
constitutionally entitled to an "automatic ex parte hearing" before an ex parte 
judge, Haynes cites a number of cases from other states that have deemed such 
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a process necessary to comport with an indigent defendant's Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Appellant's brief, p.15 (and cases cited 
therein).) Haynes' reliance on these cases as a basis for overruling Wood (to 
the extent that is what she is attempting to achieve) is misplaced for at least two 
reasons. 
First, virtually all of the cases Haynes cites were decided before the Idaho 
Supreme Court decided Wood, and at least one of those cases was specifically 
presented to and rejected by the Wood Court as a basis for finding any 
constitutional entitlement to the ex parte procedures Haynes now advocates. 
(Compare Appellant's brief, p.15 (citing State v. Ballard, 428 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. 
1993)) with Wood, 132 Idaho at 713, 967 P.2d at 713 (noting Wood's reliance on 
Ballard as support for his claim that an ex parte procedure for obtaining expert 
assistance was constitutionally required). That Haynes disagrees with the Wood 
Court's rejection of the reasoning of Ballard and the similarly decided cases 
available and/or presented to it at the time does not establish Wood was wrongly 
decided. 
Second, and more importantly, nothing in the rationale of the cases 
Haynes cites actually dictates a finding that the ex parte procedures Haynes 
sought in this case are constitutionally required. As a general rule, the courts 
that have found there is such a constitutional entitlement have done so on two 
bases - that such a procedure is demanded by U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Ake, and that requiring an indigent defendant to demonstrate the need for expert 
assistance at a hearing where the state is present places the defendant in the 
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unfair position of having to disclose defense strategy and theories before triai. 
See, s.9..:., Ex parte Moody, 684 So.2d 114, 120 (Aia. 1996); Williams v. State, 
958 S.W.2d 186, 192-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 
423, 428-29 (Tenn. 1995); Ballard, 428 S.E.2d at 179-83 (N.C. 1993) (but 
limiting requirement of ex parte hearing to requests for psychiatric assistance). 
As already found by the Idaho Supreme Court in Wood, however, nothing in the 
language of Ake compels the "conclusion that an ex parte procedure for 
obtaining expert assistance is constitutionally required." Wood, 132 Idaho at 99-
100, 967 P.2d at 713-14; see also State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 255 (S.D. 
1992); State v. Phipps, 418 S.E.2d 178, 188-91 (N.C. 1992). Nor is there any 
reasoned basis to conclude that the potential disclosure of defense theories -
when the rules of discovery already require broad disclosure by indigent and 
non-indigent defendants, alike in any way impinges on the privilege against 
self-incrimination or otherwise renders adversarial proceedings on a request for 
expert assistance fundamentally unfair. See Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739 
(Ind. 2002); State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993); Ramdass v. 
Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Va. 1993), cert. granted and judgment 
vacated on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994); Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 256. 
As explained by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Phipps, the holding 
of Ake - that indigent defendants are entitled to publicly funded expert 
psychiatric assistance when such is necessary for a fair trial - is "rooted in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and its guarantee that 
indigent defendants be afforded the '"basic tools of an adequate defense."' 
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Phi ps, 418 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77). While Ake made 
clear that expert assistance, when necessary, is itself one of the "basic tools of 
an adequate defense" that is required for a fundamentally fair trial, it did not 
prescribe or even "address the importance of the procedures by which expert 
assistance is sought." ht at 190-91. Rather, Ake expressly left "to the States 
the decision on how to implement this right." Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. Based on this 
holding, and on the Ake Court's recognition that the Constitution does not require 
"that indigent defendants have all the advantages and privileges that result from 
greater wealth," the Phipps Court, like the Idaho Supreme Court in Wood, 
concluded "Ake did not mandate that motions for expert assistance be heard ex 
parte." Phipps, 418 S.E.2d at 191. The court explained: 
Whereas an indigent defendant's access to the "basic tools 
of an adequate defense" is a core requirement of a fundamentally 
fair trial, the need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert 
assistance is not. Defendant may participate meaningfully in the 
preparation of his defense even though the prosecutor is present 
for and contests his motion for expert assistance. 
ht at 190. Accord State v. White, 457 S.3d 2d 841, 848 (N.C. 1995) ("[T]he 
need for an ex parte hearing on a motion for expert assistance is not a core 
requirement for a fundamentally fair trial."); Apelt, 861 P.2d at 650 (ex parte 
proceeding on motion for expert assistance "is not one of the 'basic tools' of an 
adequate defense"); Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 256 (statutes that "permit, but do not 
require, adversarial hearings prior to appointment of expert witnesses" did not 
violate defendant's due process or equal protection rights); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d 
at 759 (finding "no automatic constitutional entitlement to such ex parte 
proceedings" on indigent defendant's request for funds). 
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That an indigent defendant seeking expert assistance may need to 
disclose defense strategy to obtain such assistance is also not a basis for finding 
a constitutional entitlement to ex parte procedures in relation to the request for 
funds. Rejecting an argument that an ex parte hearing was necessary so the 
defendant "could present a request for expert assistance ... without 'tipping his 
hand' to the prosecution," the Arizona Supreme Court in Apelt reasoned: 
[W]e do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees 
of due process and equal protection encompass such a right. 
Neither due process nor equal protection requires that the state 
equalize the resources of the indigent and the wealthy defendant. 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,616, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2447, 41 L.Ed.2d 
341 (1974). Rather, they guarantee the indigent an opportunity to 
present his or her claims adequately and fairly. Id. To put it 
another way, the assure the indigent defendant access to the 
"basic tools" of an adequate defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). 
Arizona affords the criminal defendant the right to expert 
assistance at county expense upon a showing of need. Given the 
broad disclosure required by the Arizona Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, an ex parte hearing on the defendant's request for 
assistance would be potentially helpful to the indigent defendant 
only when the expert's analysis turns out to support a position 
contrary to that of the defendant. 
When we balance the potential benefits in some few cases 
against the harm inherent in ex parte proceedings, we cannot 
conclude such a proceeding is constitutionally required. It is not 
one of the "basic tools" of an adequate defense. 
Apelt, 861 P.2d at 650 (footnote omitted). See also Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 759 
("While we recognize that strategic considerations will often lead defense 
counsel to prefer secrecy as to their funding requests, we find no automatic 
entitlement to such ex parte proceedings."). 
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The reasoning of Apelt is sound. While disclosure of defense witnesses 
and theories before trial may have been the exception in the past, modern rules 
of discovery require indigent and non-indigent defendants, alike, to provide a 
broad range of information to the prosecution "at any time following the filing of 
charges against the defendant." I.C.R. 16(c). Among the iriformation 
defendants must disclose "upon written request" are: (1) the "results or reports of 
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in 
connection with the particular case ... which the defendant intends to introduce 
in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant 
intends to call at the trial when the results or reports related to testimony of the 
witness"; (2) "a list of names and addresses of witnesses the defendant intends 
to call at trial"; and (3) "a written summary or report of any [expert] testimony that 
the defense intends to introduce ... at trial or hearing," including a summary of 
"the witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions and the witness's 
qualifications." !.C.R. 16(c)(2)-(4). Because all defendants are subject to these 
broad disclosure requirements, a procedure for obtaining expert assistance that 
includes notice to the state puts an indigent defendant in no worse position than 
a richer counterpart; the only possible theoretical exception being that noted in 
Apelt - i.e. "when the expert's analysis turns out to support a position contrary to 
that of the defendant" such that the defendant opts not to present the expert's 
testimony at trial. Apelt, 861 P.2d at 650. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has already determined there is no 
constitutional right to ex parte proceedings on a motion for expert assistance. 
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Although Haynes would prefer this Court overrule Wood, she has failed to carry 
her burden of demonstrating that VVood was "manifestly wrong," that "it has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise," or that "overruling it is necessary to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." Dana, 
137 Idaho at 9, 43 P.3d at 768; Humphreys, 134 Idaho at 660, 8 P.3d at 655; 
Houghland Farms, Inc., 119 Idaho at 77, 803 P.2d at 983. Neither the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Ake nor the interests of indigent defendants in 
withholding otherwise discoverable information from the state compel the 
conclusion that ex parte proceedings such as those advocated by Haynes are 
constitutionally required. Because Haynes has failed to offer any persuasive 
justification for overruling Wood, she has failed to show any basis for reversing 
the district decision that affirmed the denial of her request to pursue a request for 
expert assistance in ex parte proceedings before an ex parte judge.4 
D. Even If This Court Concludes Haynes Has Met Her Burden Of 
Establishing Constitutional Error Resulting From The Denial Of Her Motion 
For Ex Parle Procedures, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
In the unlikely event this Court overrules Wood and holds an indigent 
defendant is constitutionally entitled to the ex parte procedures Haynes 
4 Haynes does not challenge the district court's determination that the magistrate 
properly exercised its discretion in denying Haynes' motion. (See generally 
Appellant's brief, pp.12-18.) If this Court adheres to the determination in Wood 
that the ex parte procedures Haynes requested are not constitutionally required, 
the district court's ruling must be affirmed on the unchallenged basis that the 
magistrate properly exercised its discretion in denying Haynes motion for ex 
parte proceedings. See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 
1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for the lower court's ruling is unchallenged 
on appeal, appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis). 
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advocates, reversal is still not required. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that 
"[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. Even constitutional errors are subject to 
a harmless error analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991). 
Absent a showing of prejudice, error will be deemed harmless. State v. Whitely, 
124 Idaho 261, 269-70, 848 P.2d 800, 808-09 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993), the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that, even if the defendant in that case had a constitutional right to an 
ex parte hearing on his motion for expert assistance, the denial of such 
procedure was harmless. The court reasoned: 
The trial court did not prevent defendant from presenting requests 
for expert assistance, as defendant claims, but merely from 
presenting them ex parte. If defendant required assistance, he 
should have requested it. Furthermore, if he had been prejudiced 
by being forced to present these requests in the presence of the 
state, he could then argue on appeal that his due process rights 
were violated. 
kt Because Apelt did not show his rights were actually adversely affected by 
having to pursue his request for expert assistance in an adversarial proceeding, 
"he could not show prejudice from the trial court's denial of' his motion. kl 
The reasoning and result of Apelt apply with equal force in this case. Like 
Apelt, Haynes was not prevented from presenting a request for expert 
assistance, but merely from presenting such request in ex parte proceedings. If 
Haynes required expert assistance, she easily could have requested it. Indeed, 
the magistrate specifically advised Haynes it would have no difficulty considering 
a "properly supported" motion for expert assistance if Haynes chose to file such 
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motion in the future. (7/18/13 Tr., p.'16, Ls.10-15.) Had Haynes pursued a 
motion for expert assistance and actually been prejudiced by having to present 
the bases for her request in front of either the state or the presiding magistrate, 
Haynes might then have a viable claim of a due process violation. As it stands, 
however, Haynes has not even attempted to demonstrate she was actually 
prejudiced by the mere denial of her motion to proceed ex parte. She argues, 
generally, that requiring her to make a showing of need for expert assistance in 
front of the state would have required her to reveal defense strategy. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) But the record shows the state was already well 
aware of Haynes' strategy; Haynes had already filed a pretrial motion challenging 
the validity of her breath test results (R., pp.23-33, 124-34), and Haynes' 
attorney specifically stated at the outset of the hearing on the motion for ex parte 
procedures that Haynes would be seeking expert assistance in relation the 
breath test (7 /18/13 Tr., p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.1 ). Because the substance of 
Haynes' defense was already well known to the state, and because Haynes has 
not demonstrated she was otherwise actually prejudiced by the denial of her 
motion for ex parte proceedings, any error in the denial of that motion was 
necessarily harmless. Apelt, 861 P.2d at 650; see also State v. Touchet, 642 
So.2d 1213, 1220-21 (La. 1994) (no prejudice in not holding ex parte hearing on 
application for expert assistance when "particulars disclosed in the application 
would not contribute to the defense, or when the defense is well-known to the 
state") (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)). 
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111. 
Ha nes Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The 
Magistrate Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts in Denying Haynes' Motion 
In Umine To Exclude The Breath Test Results 
A. Introduction 
Haynes challenges the denial of her motion in limine to exclude the results 
of her breath test, arguing as she did to the magistrate and district courts below 
that the accuracy of those results is inherently unreliable for two reasons. 
First, she argues that the breath test results were inadmissible because 
ISP has failed to comply with its statutory duty to establish methods to ensure 
the reliability of breath test results in general. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.) The 
Idaho Court of Appeals recently considered and rejected this precise argument in 
State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. 
Haynes has presented no cogent reason why Besaw should be overruled, nor 
has she demonstrated from the record that the testing procedures utilized in her 
case actually produced an unreliable result. Having failed to do so, Haynes has 
failed to show error in the denial of her motion to exclude the test results on this 
basis. 
Second, Haynes argues that the failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in creating SOPs and manuals for breath 
alcohol testing renders those SOPs and manuals void and all BAC testing based 
on those standards too unreliable for use at a criminal trial. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.24-31.) This argument fails for several alternative reasons. First, nothing in 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires formal rulemaking as a prerequisite to the admissibility 
of results of breath tests performed pursuant to methods approved by ISP. 
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Second, if ISP's creation of the SOPs is agency action governed by the 
requirements of the !APA, Haynes' exclusive means for challenging such action 
was through the judicial review provisions of the IAPA; she has no standing to 
raise, and neither the lower courts nor this Court have jurisdiction to consider, a 
challenge to the validity of the SOPs as a basis for excluding breath test results 
in a criminal case. Finally, even if this Court reaches the merits of Haynes' 
argument, correct application of the law shows the SOPs are not rules and, as 
such, no compliance with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was 
required. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section 1.8., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is 
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[sJ to the trial court's findings of fact 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 
134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including 
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission 
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v. 
Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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,.... 
I...,. Havnes Has Failed To Show Anv Basis For Reversal Based On Her 
Claim. Already Rejected In State v. Besaw. That ISP Has Failed To 
Establish Methods To Ensure The Reliabili Of BAC Test Results 
In order to have the results of a breath test admitted as evidence at trial, 
the state must make a foundational showing that the administrative procedures 
which ensure the reliability of the test have been met. State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 
734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2011 ); State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 
979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 129, 867 P.2d 
1001, 1003 (Ct. App. 1993)). To satisfy this foundational requirement, "the state 
may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an expedient method for admitting 
BAG test results into evidence when the analysis is conducted pursuant to [Idaho 
State Police ("ISP")] standards." State v. Uhlry, 121 Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d 
1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Healy, 151 Idaho at 737, 
264 P.3d at 78; State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Specifically, that statute provides: 
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining 
the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory 
operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by 
the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and 
certification standards to be set by that department, or by any other 
method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for 
alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method 
approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in a 
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a 
witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). "If the State elects to proceed under§ 18-8004(4), it must not 
only show that the test equipment was approved by [ISP] but also that the 
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equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with [ISP] 
standards." Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 411, 973 P.2d at 763 (citing State v. Beil, 
115 Idaho 36, 39-40, 764 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
Haynes acknowledges that, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), breath test 
results are admissible if they were obtained in conformity with ISP methods 
meant to ensure the reliability of the results. She argues, however, that no such 
methods actually exists because ISP has, in several instances, modified its 
SOPs for breath alcohol testing by replacing what were once mandatory testing 
procedures with testing recommendations that need not be uniformly complied 
with, thereby "render[ing] the SOPs incapable of ensuring accuracy" of breath 
test results, generally. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.) Haynes' argument fails 
because it is merely a rehashing of the argument already considered and 
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 142-
44, 306 P.3d 219, 227-29 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. 
Like Haynes, Besaw argued "that although ISP is charged by statute with 
adopting alcohol concentration standards meant to ensure the reliability of test 
results, the agency has abdicated this responsibility by replacing standards with 
testing recommendations that are not meant to ensure the accuracy of test 
results but, rather, to facilitate the admissibility of test results." Besaw, 155 Idaho 
at 143, 306 P.3d at 228 (emphases original). Specifically, he argued that 
because ISP had "changed a number of former 'must' testing requirements to 
'should' recommendations within the SOPs," the SOPs effectively fail to set forth 
any standards for breath testing. kl at 143-44, 306 P.3d at 228-29. 
30 
The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and, in so doing, rejected Besaw's 
argument, which was based on the dissenting opinion in Wheeler v. Idaho 
Transp. De t., 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied, that 
"nonmandatory standards [are] tantamount to no standards at all." Besaw, 155 
Idaho at 144, 306 P.3d at 229. Although the Court was troubled by some of the 
information Besaw presented "about the manner in which the SOPs for breath 
testing have been developed or amended," the Court was not persuaded by any 
evidence before it "that the SOP procedures are incapable of yielding accurate 
tests." kl Because Besaw failed to present any evidence "establish[ing] that the 
test procedures actually authorized by the SOPs and applied in Besaw's case 
[were] incapable of producing reliable tests," the Court found "no error in the 
magistrate court's denial of Besaw's motion to exclude the test results from 
evidence." kl 
The reasoning and result of Besaw are controlling in this case. Like 
Besaw, Haynes argues that ISP has replaced the word "must" with the word 
"should" in several provisions of the SOPs. 5 (Appellant's brief, p.23.) And, like 
Besaw, Haynes contends that the replacement of what were once mandatory 
breath testing methods with nonmandatory methods has resulted in there being 
no "method" at all to ensure the accuracy of breath test results. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.20-24.) Like Besaw, however, Haynes has failed to present any 
5 Although failure to follow a procedure that "should" have been followed would 
not have prevented the admission of the test result, Haynes would have been 
free to argue that any such failure affected the weight the jury should give the 
evidence. 
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evidence to demonstrate the SOPs, as amended, are incapable of yielding 
accurate results. Nor has she even argued, much less demonstrated, that 
Trooper Keys failed to comply with any of the "recommended" procedures in 
administering the breath test in this case or that any such failure actually affected 
the accuracy of her test results. 6 Because she has failed to do so, Haynes, like 
Besaw, has failed to show any basis for exclusion of the breath test results in her 
case. 
Haynes acknowledges the holding of Besaw but asks this Court to 
overrule it. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-24.) As support for her request, Haynes 
merely repeats the arguments that were presented to and rejected by the Court 
in Besaw. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp.20-24 with Besaw, 155 Idaho at 142-
44, 306 P.3d at 227-29.) That Haynes believes Besaw was wrongly decided 
does make it so. Haynes has not presented any new argument and has not 
otherwise pointed to anything in the record to demonstrate that Besaw has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise. Having failed to do so, Haynes has 
6 Haynes identifies only two "instances" in which "the SOPs have been modified 
so that the word 'must' has been replaced by the word 'should"': "1. The 
necessity to have the correct acceptable range limits and performance 
verification standard lot number set in the instrument prior to evidentiary testing"; 
and "2. The need to monitor the subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test to 
ensure there is no alcohol being regurgitated or in the mouth." (Appellant's brief, 
p.23 (citations omitted).) Haynes does not contend Trooper Keys failed to 
perform either of these procedures, nor could she based on the record in this 
case. Haynes presented no evidence below that Trooper Keys failed to properly 
calibrate the breath testing instrument, and the video of the traffic stop, 
introduced below as Defendant's Exhibit B, affirmatively shows that Trooper 
Keys monitored Haynes for two consecutive 15-minute periods (the officer was 
unaware Haynes had gum in her mouth during the first 15-minute observation 
period and, so, conducted a second 15-minute observation period after ensuring 
Haynes no longer had anything in her mouth) before administering the test. 
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faiied to demonstrate any basis why Besaw should be overruled. See State v. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (controlling precedent will 
not be overruied "unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the 
holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust" (citations 
omitted)). The district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of 
Haynes' motion to exclude the breath test results ( on the claimed basis that there 
exist no methods to ensure the reliability of the results) must therefore be 
affirmed. 
D. Haynes Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Excluding Her Breath Test 
Results Based On Her Claim That ISP Did Not Comply With The Formal 
Rulemaking Requirements Of The IAPA In Adopting The SOPs For 
Breath Alcohol Testing 
1. Nothing In I.C. § 18-8004(4) Requires Compliance With The 
Rulemaking Requirements Of The IAPA As A Prerequisite To The 
Admissibility Of Results Of BAC Testing Performed Pursuant To 
Methods Approved By ISP 
Idaho's DUI statute states it is unlawful for a person with "an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as 
shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle" on a road or place open to the public. I.C. § 18-
8004(1 )(a). Subsection (4), in turn, sets forth a formula of grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath upon which upon which "an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration shall be based" and states that such breath tests shall be 
performed by an approved laboratory or "by any other method approved by the 
Idaho state police." I.C. § 18-8004(4). That subsection continues: 
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the 
results of any test fm alcohol concentration and records relating to 
calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a 
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any 
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be 
admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing 
procedure for examination. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
As contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4), ISP has approved certain methods 
for breath alcohol testing and standards for the administration of such tests, and 
those approved methods have been set out by ISP in the form of "Standard 
Operating Procedures" and training manuals (hereinafter collectively "SOPs"). 
(See R., pp.34-123, 138-236); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d 
219, 225 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Haynes does not contend that, in 
administering her breath test, Trooper Keys failed to comply with any of the 
methods or procedures set forth in the SOPs. Rather, she argues the methods 
themselves are invalid because there is nothing in the record indicating that ISP 
complied with the rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., in 
adopting the SOPs. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-31.) Haynes' challenge to the 
manner in which ISP approved the methods for breath alcohol testing does not 
show any basis for exclusion of her breath test results because nothing in the 
governing law requires compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA 
as a prerequisite to the admissibility of results of BAC testing performed pursuant 
to methods approved by ISP. 
Promulgation of rules is required under the IAPA only where "specifically 
authorized by statute." I.C. § 67-5231(1). The plain language of I.C. § 18-
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8004(4) states that, "[njotwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court," 
resuits of BAC testing "shall be admissible," without the necessity of producing 
expert testimony, if the test was "performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the 
Idaho state police." (Emphasis added). Nothing in this statute authorizes or 
requires ISP to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the !APA in 
approving the methods for determining an individual's breath alcohol 
concentration, nor does the statute make compliance with the IAPA a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of BAC test results in a criminal proceeding. To 
the contrary, the statute provides that such results are admissible if the test was 
performed by "any ... method approved by" ISP. I.C. § 18-8004(4). Because 
Haynes has never argued, much less demonstrated, that Trooper Keys failed to 
comply with any of the methods set out in the SOPs in administering her breath 
test, she has failed to show any basis for exclusion of her test results in the 
criminal case. 
The state recognizes the legislature has, in a related statute, conferred 
rulemaking authority upon ISP for purposes of administrative license suspension 
proceedings. Specifically, I.C. § 18-8002A provides: 
(3) Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho 
state police may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, 
prescribe by rule: 
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under 
this section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be 
performed to comply with the department's requirements. Any 
rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the 
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foilowing: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (1) (e) of this section 
will be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol 
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state 
poiice in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time 
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing .... 
LC. § 18-8002A(3). By its plain language, however, the rulemaking authority 
granted by I.C. § 18-8002A does not extend to the approval of methods for 
breath alcohol testing contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4). To the contrary, the 
statute limits what ISP may prescribe by rule to the determinations of "[w]hat 
testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section [18-8002A]" 
and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to 
comply with the department's requirements." The statute also mandates that any 
rule so prescribed recognize that, for purposes of the license suspension 
provisions of I. C. § 18-8002A, a test for breath alcohol concentration is valid "if 
the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state 
police in accordance with section 18-8004." In so doing, the legislature clearly 
indicated that the approval of breath testing equipment and methods required 
under I.C. § 18-8004 is not itself subject to the rulemaking requirements of the 
IAPA. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that ISP approve BAC testing 
methods by formal rulemaking. Therefore, Haynes' argument that the SOPs 
were not adopted pursuant to the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is 
irrelevant to the admissibility of her breath test results under this section. 
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2. If ISP's Creation Of The SOPs Is A ency Action Governed By The 
Requirements Of The LAPA Haynes' Exclusive Means For 
Challenging Such Action Was Through The Judicial Review 
Provisions Of The IAPA 
Haynes argues that, because administrative license suspension hearings 
"held per I.C. § 18-8002A are agency action controlled by [the IAPA]," ISP's 
approval of methods for BAC testing for purposes of admissibility of test results 
under I.C. § 18-8004(4) must also be "agency action falling under the 
requirements of [the IAPAJ." (Appellant's brief, p.29.) For the reasons set forth 
in Section 111.D.1, supra, Haynes has failed to show that ISP's compliance or lack 
thereof with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is at all relevant to 
the determination of the admissibility of her breath test results under I.C. § 18-
8004(4). If Haynes is correct, however - and ISP's approval of BAC testing 
methods for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004(4) is agency action governed by the 
IAPA - Haynes had no standing to bring, and neither the lower courts nor this 
Court have no jurisdiction to consider, a challenge to the manner in which ISP 
approved BAC testing methods as a basis for excluding the breath test result in 
the criminal case. 
"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless 
expressly authorized by statute." Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho 
867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1 )); Johnson v. 
State, 153 Idaho 246, 250, 280 P.3d 749, 753 (2012) (same). Idaho Code§ 67-
5270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an 
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See I.C. § 
67-5201(3) (definition of "Agency action"); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871,243 P.3d at 
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1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court"). 
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final 
agency action" must comply with the procedural requirements of I.C. §§ 67-5271 
through 67-5279. I.C. § 67-5270(2); BV Beverage Co., LLC v. State, 155 Idaho 
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 
1058. Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a 
"rule," compliance with the procedural requirements necessary to obtain judicial 
review requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all available 
administrative remedies (1.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or 
declaratory judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which 
the final agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (I.C. § 
67-5272(1 )), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being 
challenged (I.C. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the 
action (I.C. § 67-5278). Haynes did not comply with any of these procedural 
requirements, nor could she ever have done so in the criminal case. 
From the beginning of this case, Haynes has sought a judicial ruling 
invalidating the SOPs for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied 
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing 
methods contained in the SOPs. But Haynes herself did not comply with the 
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judicial review provisions of the IAPA. To the state's knowledge, she did not 
attempt to pursue any available administrative remedies. 7 i.C. § 67-5271. Nor 
did she "institute" any "proceedings for review or declaratory judgment" by filing a 
timely petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming ISP as a 
party to the action. I.C. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278. Instead, Haynes has 
attempted to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding her breath test 
result in the criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including 
I. C. § 18-8004, enables Haynes to challenge the validity of IS P's action in this 
forum and in this manner. Haynes' attempt to do so is, in her own words, 
nothing more than an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of 
the IAPA. (Appellant's brief, p.25.) 
Because there is no statute that authorizes Haynes to raise ISP's alleged 
noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a defense in the 
criminal case, Haynes lacked standing to bring the challenge and both the lower 
courts and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it. See Laughy, 149 
7 The state confesses is not aware of any specific administrative remedy by 
which Haynes could challenge the validity of ISP's adoption of the SOPs and 
methods for BAG testing contained therein. Although I.C. § 18-8002A(7) allows 
for an administrative hearing when a person's driver's license has been 
suspended as a result of failing a BAG test, failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods for BAC testing is 
not one of the grounds upon which the license suspension may be vacated. In 
addition, I.C. § 67-5278 appears to contemplate that the validity of an agency 
rule may be challenged in an action for declaratory judgment, without the 
necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Asarco, Inc. v. State, 
138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) (mining companies did not have to exhaust 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of validity of state 
agency's action in issuing a total maximum daily load limit without complying with 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA). 
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!daho at 870, 243 P .3d at 1058 ("Without an enabling statute, the district court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action} If the IAPA applies to 
!SP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, it also applies to bar 
Haynes' attempt to challenge those actions in the criminal case. 
3. Even If This Court Entertains The Merits Of Haynes' Challenge To 
ISP's Approval Of BAC Testing Methods, Correct Application Of 
The Law Shows The SOPs Are Not Rules And, As Such, No 
Formal Rulemaking Was Required 
The legislature has given ISP authority to prescribe by rule "[w]hat testing 
is required to complete evidentiary testing" for alcohol concentration under I.C. § 
18-8002A and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be 
performed to comply with the department's requirements." I.C. § 18-8002(3)(a), 
(b). Pursuant to this authority, ISP has promulgated administrative "Rules 
Governing Alcohol Testing." See Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) 11.03.01, 
et seq. Relevant to this appeal is IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, which governs the 
administration of breath alcohol testing. Specifically, the rule provides: 
03. Administration. Breath tests shall be administered 
in conformity with standards established by the department. 
Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing 
instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the 
form of analytical methods and standard operating procedures. 
IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03. Pursuant to its plain language - and consistent with the 
requirements of I.C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004(4) - this rule leaves to ISP the 
task of developing standards for the administration of breath tests and of issuing 
such standards "in the form of analytical methods and standard operating 
procedures." Nowhere in this rule or in the legislative mandate of I.C. §§ 18-
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8002A and 18-8004( 4) is there any requirement that the SOPs themselves be 
established as rules in compliance with the IAPA. 
On appeal, Haynes does not challenge the validity of IDAPA 
11.03.01 .14.03 or contend that that rule, which expressiy authorizes ISP to 
establish methods for breath testing and issue them in the form of SOPs, was 
improperly promulgated. Instead, she argues that the SOPs themselves meet 
the legal definition of an agency "rule" and, therefore, compliance with the formal 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was required. (Appellant's brief, pp.25-31.) 
For the reasons set forth in Sections II1.D.1 and 111.D.2, supra, this Court should 
decline to entertain the merits of Haynes' argument. Even if this Court does 
consider Haynes' challenge to the validity of ISP's action in adopting the SOPs 
without engaging in formal rulemaking beyond that which occurred in adopting 
IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, the challenge fails because the SOPs are not agency 
"rules" under the applicable law. 
An agency action is a rule only where the action in question meets all of 
six characteristics. Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143 
(2003). Those characteristics include that the action in question "prescribes a 
legal standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute," 
"expresses agency policy not previously expressed," and "is an interpretation of 
law or general policy." .!.9..c; see also I.C. § 67-5201(19) (definition of "Rule"). 
Where an agency merely carries forth its assigned task without cresting 
additional legal requirements or interpreting law or general policy it does not 
create rules subject to the procedures of the IAPA. See Sons and Daughters of 
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Idaho Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm'n., 142 Idaho 659, 663-64, 132 P.3d 416, 420-
21 (2006) (Gaming Update not a ruie where it did not prescribe a legal standard 
but merely explained existing rules); Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Beacom, 131 
Idaho 569, 570-72, 961 P.2d 660, 661-63 (1998) (adoption of tax form to carry 
out required function of self-reporting taxes not rulemaking function). 
Applying the above principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already 
concluded that the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA do "not apply when the 
Idaho state police approves the methods for determining an individual's alcohol 
concentration." State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 597, 83 P.3d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 
2004) (emphasis added). In Alford, the defendant sought to exclude his BAC 
test result on the basis that ISP did not comply with the rulemaking requirements 
of the IAPA when it approved the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill, the breath-testing 
device used in Alford's case. ~ at 597-98, 83 P.3d at 141-42. Citing the 
characteristics of agency rules identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in Asarco, 
supra, the Court of Appeals determined "the Idaho state police action approving 
the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill was not rulemaking" because it neither prescribed 
any new legal standard or agency policy nor interpreted any law. Id. The court 
reasoned: 
The DUI statute already prescribes the legal standard limiting an 
individual's alcohol concentration. Alford has failed to demonstrate 
that any Idaho state police policy was expressed, or that any law or 
policy was interpreted, by the approval of the Alco-Sensor Ill. 
Instead, the Idaho state police properly carried out a statutory duty 
to authorize the use of certain breath-testing equipment by law 
enforcement agencies. In doing so, it identified equipment that it 
found to be suitable for such purpose. It did not create additional 
legal requirements. Thus, the state was not required to provide 
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evidence of Idaho state police compliance with IAPA in approving 
the use of the Alco-Sensor 111. 
ill..c at 598, 83 P.3d at 142. 
Haynes has not even cited Alford, much less attempted to distinguish it. 
Nor can she. Just as the approval of breath-testing equipment is not rulemaking, 
neither is the approval of methods to conduct such testing according to the 
standards of I.C. § 18-8004(4). As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in 
Alford, I.C. § 18-8004 "already prescribes the legal standard limiting an 
individual's alcohol concentration." Alford, 139 Idaho at 598, 83 P.3d at 142. 
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not prescribe any new 
legal standard for DUI, nor do they interpret any existing law or policy. To the 
contrary, the state police action in adopting the SOPs was merely the carrying 
out of the legislative directive to approve methods for BAC testing pursuant to 
the statute. While compliance with the methods so approved is a prerequisite to 
the admissibility of breath test results in the absence of expert testimony, this 
legal requirement exists by virtue of the enabling statute itself, see I.C. § 18-
8004(4), not because of any action on the part of ISP. 
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not create any 
binding law or policy; they are merely procedural standards that, if followed by 
law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal 
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
Because the SOPs do not themselves prescribe or interpret any law, they are not 
"rules" to which the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA apply. Haynes' 
arguments to the contrary are without merit and do not establish any basis for 
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reversal of the magistrate's order denying her motion in limine to exclude her 
BAC test results from trial. 8 
IV. 
Haynes Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The 
Magistrate Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying Haynes' Motion 
To Suppress The Breath Test Results 
A. Introduction 
Haynes moved to suppress her breath test results, arguing that her 
consent to the BAC testing was not voluntary because it was obtained after 
Trooper Keys played an audio recording advising her of the administrative 
license suspension that would attach if she refused the test. (R., pp.240-50.) 
The magistrate denied the motion, and the district court affirmed, ruling that 
Haynes' consent was constitutionally valid under the implied consent exception 
to the warrant requirement. (7/18/13 Tr., p.39, L.20 - p.41, L.18; 2/21/14 Tr., 
p.34, L.20 - p.36, L.18.) 
Haynes challenges the lower courts' rulings, arguing as she did below that 
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, _ U.S. _, 133 
S.Ct. 1552 (2013), invalidated Idaho's implied consent law. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.31-41.) She also argues her actual consent was not voluntary because it was 
8 Even if compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving 
the methods for BAC testing contained in the SOPs were a prerequisite to the 
expedient admissibility of BAC test results under I.C. § 18-8004(4), the inability 
of the state to show such compliance would not, by itself, be grounds for 
excluding the test result. "Rather, the State, as a second option, may call an 
expert witness to establish the reliability of the test, thereby making test results 
admissible." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 737, 264 P.3d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citation omitted); see also I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
44 
obtained only after being read the ALS advisories that informed her she was 
"required by law" to take the test. (id.) Neither of Haynes' arguments have merit. 
Correct application of the law supports the lower courts' determinations that 
implied consent is still a valid exception to the warrant requirement and that 
Haynes' impliedly consented to breath test in this case. To the extent Haynes' 
actual consent is relevant, the mere fact that the officer advised Haynes of the 
actual consequences that would result if Haynes refused the test was not 
unconstitutionally coercive. Haynes has failed to establish any basis for reversal 
of the magistrate's order denying her motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
C. Implied Consent Is A Viable Exception To The Warrant Requirement And 
Justified The Warrantless Evidentiary Test In This Case 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
45 
Kerley. 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474. 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) Consent is such an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied 
consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1). State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 
P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007); State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907-08, 243 P.3d 
1093, 1095-96 (Ct. App. 2010). Under that statute "the State is entitled to 
conduct blood or breath-alcohol concentration tests of drivers suspected of DUI, 
and neither a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination nor his 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches is violated by such 
testing if it is conducted in a reasonable manner." State v. Green, 149 Idaho 
706, 709, 239 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 201 O); see also State v. Wagner, 149 
Idaho 268, 270, 233 P.3d 199, 201 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C. § 18-8002(1 )). 
By accepting the privilege of driving on Idaho's roadways, Haynes 
impliedly consented to evidentiary testing to determine her alcohol concentration, 
provided such "testing [was] administered by a peace officer with reasonable 
grounds for suspicion of DUI." LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 909, 243 P.3d at 1097 
(citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712, 184 P.3d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 2008); 
I.C. § 18-8002(1 )). It is undisputed that, at the time Trooper Keys administered 
the breath test to Haynes in this case, he had reasonable suspicion that Haynes 
was driving under the influence: She smelled like alcohol, her "eyes were 
reddened and her speech was slurred," and she failed field sobriety tests. (R., 
p.9.) It is also undisputed that the officer conducted the evidentiary testing in a 
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reasonable manner: He played the ALS advisories for Haynes, asked her if she 
was willing to take a breath test and, when Haynes indicated she was, the officer 
monitored Haynes for more than 15 minutes and then administered the test by 
having Haynes blow into a portable Lifeloc breath testing device. (R., p.9; 
Defendant's Exhibit B.) Because the officer had reasonable suspicion of DUI, 
and because the record shows the officer acted reasonably in administering the 
evidentiary testing, the warrantless testing was justified by Haynes' implied 
consent to submit to such testing as a condition of driving on Idaho's roads. 
Haynes argues otherwise. Specifically she argues that, after the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely. _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1552 
(2013), implied consent is no longer a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp.31-41.) Haynes' assertion that McNeely - a 
case addressing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement 
- did away with the implied consent exception to the warrant requirement, or re-
wrote Idaho's implied consent statute, does not withstand scrutiny. 
This Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent circumstances are 
different exceptions to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 
P.3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable exception here; 
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement."). The 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this as well in McNeely. In that 
case the only question before the Court was "whether the natural metabolization 
of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual 
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blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeeiy, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. The Court 
held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on 
the totality of the circumstances." Id. Thus, the issue was limited to 
"nonconsensua/ blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited to 
the exigent circumstances exception. Thus, consensual breath tests, such as at 
issue in this case, were not within the scope of either the issue or the holding in 
McNeely. 
In arguing that implied consent is no longer a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, Haynes summarizes the McNeely holding as follows: "[A] 
warrantless evidentiary test in a DUI case is presumptively unconstitutional, and 
a person does have the right to refuse to do the test until a warrant has been 
secured or an exception to the warrant requirement exists." (Appellant's brief, 
p.35.) Even assuming, without conceding, that McNeely overruled Idaho 
precedent holding that a driver has no right to revoke his or her implied consent 
to warrantless evidentiary testing, it did not invalidate the implied consent 
exception in toto. To the contrary, in addressing whether a case-by-case 
analysis under the exigency exception would "undermine the governmental 
interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses," the Court 
specifically observed that states would still "have a broad range of legal tools to 
enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent laws." 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1565-66. The Court also cited with approval its prior 
decision in North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), which held that 
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evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a blood test under implied consent laws 
is constitutionally admissible evidence of his guilt. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566. 
Thus, far from holding that the state may not legally imply consent by a motorist, 
the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws. 
In addition, to the extent McNeely compels the conclusion that a driver 
may revoke his or her implied consent to warrantless BAC testing, such 
conclusion is irrelevant under the facts of this case. Unlike McNeely, who 
refused to submit to evidentiary testing, Haynes submitted without objection to 
the breath test in this case. (R., p.9; Defendant's Exhibit B.) Having done so, 
and having otherwise impliedly consented to evidentiary testing as a condition of 
using Idaho's roads, Haynes cannot successfully complain that the warrantless 
testing violated her constitutional rights. This is true despite Haynes' assertions 
that her actual consent to the breath test was not voluntary. 
Implied consent is an exception to the warrant requirement different than 
actual consent, such that the state does not have to prove that a motorist who 
submitted to a BAC test under implied consent gave actual consent. State v. 
Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 409-10, 973 P.2d 758, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(argument that "consent ... was involuntary is of no consequence because 
[motorist] had impliedly consented"). The argument that implied consent must 
also meet the requirements of actual consent such as voluntariness has been 
"roundly rejected." LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911-12, 243 P.3d at 1099-100. It is 
quite clear in the law that application of the implied consent exception is not 
contingent upon the motorist having provided actual consent as well. Because 
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the breath test in this case was justified by Haynes' implied consent, the state did 
not have to demonstrate that Haynes' actuai consent was voluntary. The district 
court's appellate decision affirming the magistrate's order denying Haynes' 
motion to suppress should therefore be affirmed on this basis. 
D. To The Extent Haynes' Actual Consent Is Legally Relevant, The Mere 
Fact That Trooper Keys Advised Haynes Of The License Suspension 
Consequences That Would Result If Haynes Refused The Test Did Not 
Render That Consent Involuntary 
Haynes acknowledges she actually consented to take the breath test in 
this case. She argues, however, that her consent was involuntary because it 
was obtained only after Trooper Keys played the ALS advisories that informed 
Haynes of the license suspension consequences that would result if she refused 
to take the test. (Appellant's brief, pp.31-41.) For the reasons set forth in 
Section IV.C, supra, the validity of Haynes' actual consent is irrelevant because 
Haynes impliedly consented to BAG testing as a condition of driving on Idaho's 
roads. Even if Haynes' consent argument were legally relevant, it still fails 
because she has failed to show her actual consent was involuntary. 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (citations omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 
1057 (2003); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). 
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225-26 
(citations omitted). In order to be voluntary, consent cannot be the result of 
duress or coercion, either direct or implied. 1.9.c at 248. Merely informing a 
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suspect that the "officer intends to do something that the officer is !egal!y 
authorized to do under the circumstances ... does not amount to coercion." 
LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911, 243 P.3d at 1099 (citing State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 
774, 779-80, 152 P.3d 645, 650-51 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
In this case, Trooper Keys obtained Haynes' consent to breath testing 
after he played her an audio recording of the ALS advisories that informed her of 
the license suspension penalties she faced if she refused the test. (R., p.9; 
Defendant's Exhibits A and B.) Specifically, the ALS advisories informed Haynes 
that she was "required by law to take one or more evidentiary test(s) to 
determine" her alcohol concentration and that, if she "refuse[d] to take or 
complete any of the offered tests," she would be subject to the license 
suspension penalties set forth in I.C. § 18-8002. (R., p.18; Defendant's Exhibit 
B.) Haynes argues that, under McNeely, supra, she had the right to refuse 
evidentiary testing and, therefore, playing the ALS advisories that advised her 
she had no such right necessarily coerced her consent. (Appellant's brief, pp.38-
41.) Haynes' argument is without merit. 
Although the ALS advisory informed Haynes she was required by law to 
submit to BAC testing, the advisory also specifically informed Haynes of the 
consequences of a refusal. Moreover, the record shows Trooper Keys actually 
gave Haynes the choice of consenting to or refusing to consent to test. 
(Defendant's Exhibit B.) That Haynes was advised she would face civil penalties 
if she did not submit to the test did not render her consent to the test involuntary. 
"The voluntariness of consent is not impaired simply because one is faced with 
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two unpleasant choices." Garcia, 143 Idaho at 779, 152 P.3d at 650, quoted in 
LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911, 243 P.3d at 1099. Because the ALS advisories 
accurately informed Haynes of the penalties she faced if she refused to submit to 
BAC testing, those advisories did not themselves amount to coercion rendering 
Haynes' consent involuntary. LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911, 243 P.3d at 1099. 
Haynes has failed to show any basis for reversal of the denial of her motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision affirming Haynes' conviction for misdemeanor 
DUI. 
DATED this 29th day of September 2014. 
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